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We examine the robustness of warm glow preferences to changes in the choice set.
Behavioural warm glow is measured using the crowded-out charity dictator game of
Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In the give treatment, subjects could donate any part of
their endowment to charity where their donations completely crowd out the charity’s
own initial endowment. In the give/take treatment, the option to take any part of the char-
ity’s endowment was added to the subjects’ choice set. Experienced warm glow is mea-
sured by a series of post-decision self-reports of positive affect. Within each treatment
behavioural and experienced warm glow are positively correlated, such that the more sub-
jects donated to charity the better they claimed to feel about themselves. However, when
comparing across treatments the addition of the take option results in a fall in behavioural
warm glow but a rise in experienced warm glow. We interpret these results as evidence for
(i) a utility function increasing in both money and morality and (ii) a type of moral rela-
tivism whereby the morally good action is defined in relation to the available options.
This means that utility is derived from both the chosen option and from foregone opportu-
nities, the implication of which is that the transitivity axiom becomes practically
unfalsifiable.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The existence of warm glow preferences, where utility is derived from the act of giving as opposed to its consequences,
has significant implications for economics. In the theoretical literature, the more commonly assumed consequentialist moti-
vation for giving, called altruism, results in the complete crowding out of an individual’s voluntary donation by donations
from other sources. Termed the neutrality hypothesis, consequentialist altruism can render governments’ charitable dona-
tions as completely ineffectual (Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986; Warr, 1982) and, when applied to intergenerational
transfers, results in Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974).
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complete crowding out result no longer holds. He contrasts altruistic preferences, where giving is motivated entirely by
its outcome, with warm glow preferences, where the motivation is independent of the outcome. In the context of public
goods, altruistic preferences can be defined by uðxi;GÞ and warm glow preferences by uðxi; giÞ, where in each case utility
is increasing in both of its arguments. Here, xi is an individual’s own income, gi is their own contribution to the public good
and G is the total level of the public good. This distinction gives complete crowding out with altruistic preferences, zero
crowding out with warm glow preferences and partial crowding out when both types are present.
The label ‘‘warm glow” (Andreoni, 1989) and its description as a ‘‘joy of giving” (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002) both allude to
some kind of positive experienced utility. However, as defined by Andreoni (1989), warm glow preferences are entirely beha-
vioural, explicitly defined as the act as opposed to the outcome and are independent of any actual experienced emotions,
warm or otherwise. For the purpose of clarity, in this paper we define warm glow preferences as behavioural warm glow
and any associated positive affect as experienced warm glow. By measuring each type separately in a dictator game where
the choice set varies between treatments, we examine further the nature of warm glow preferences, their connection to
experienced positive affect and the importance of this relationship in explaining violations of menu independence in alloca-
tion decisions.
Our procedure for measuring behavioural warm glow is taken from Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In their charity dic-
tator game experiment both dictator subjects and charity recipients each begin with an initial $10 endowment. Dictators are
given the opportunity to give all, part or none of their endowment to the charity recipients. However, their donations are
subject to one-to-one crowding out, whereby for every dollar they give the charity’s initial endowment falls by one dollar,
meaning the final outcome of a $10 donation to charity is independent of subjects’ choices. Hence, any donation to the char-
ity is assumed to be motivated solely by the act of giving rather than its consequences and is interpreted as a measure of
behavioural warm glow. Their results indicate extensive behavioural warm glow with 57% of subjects making a positive
donation and a mean allocation of $2.08.
We repeat the Crumpler and Grossman design with two notable additions: post-decision measures of experienced warm-
glow and an alternative treatment with an expanded choice set. In our design subjects are randomly allocated to one of two
treatments. In the first treatment, termed the give treatment, subjects initially receive a £2 earned endowment for them-
selves and also choose a charity to receive a provisional £2 donation, termed the experimenter donation. They are then given
the opportunity to give all, part or none of their £2 endowment to the charity on the understanding that whatever amount
they give the experimenter donation will fall by the same amount, meaning the charity will always receive exactly £2 irre-
spective of their decision.
In the second treatment, termed the give/take treatment, the procedure is identical except that subjects also have the
opportunity to take all, part or none of the initial experimenter donation for themselves. Hence, the choice set in the give
treatment ranges from £0 to +£2, whereas its range is expanded to £2 to +£2 in the give/take treatment. Although giving
is still crowded out in the give/take treatment, there is no crowding in or out for taking. In both treatments, post-decision
measures of experienced warm glow are taken in the form of three questions, which ask subjects to rate their degree of pos-
itive affect.
In the give treatment, our results are similar to Crumpler and Grossman (2008) with 54% of subjects displaying beha-
vioural warm glow by making positive allocations, with a mean allocation of £0.54. The addition of the take option signif-
icantly reduces allocations, as is the case in the dictator games of Bardsley (2008) and List (2007). In the give/take treatment
27% of subjects make positive allocations, 3% (one subject) choose to take, while the remainder does neither.1 Here the mean
allocation falls to £0.24. The proportion of subjects giving zero rises from 46% in the give treatment to 70% in the give/take treat-
ment. Given any conventional outcome-based formulation of utility, this significant increase suggests a failure of expansion
consistency and intransitive preferences.
Within each treatment behavioural warm glow is positively correlated with experienced warm glow, and a cursory anal-
ysis of this relationship may suggest that each type should be subject to the same treatment effect. However, this is not the
case. Whereas the take option reduces behavioural warm glow, its inclusion increases experienced warm glow. The aggre-
gate measure of experienced warm glow is significantly higher in the give/take treatment than in the give treatment, and this
difference and significance are increased once the lower level of allocations in the give/take treatment is controlled for.
We contend that this pattern, of counter-directional treatment effects, is consistent with a model of decision making that
is as emotional as it is reasoned, whereby a desire for experienced warm glow is the motivation behind behavioural warm
glow. In our model, utility is increasing in both money and morality, where larger donations to charity buy a greater sense of
morality in the form of higher experienced warm glow. However, the connection between giving and morality, that is the
connection between behavioural and experienced warm glow, is subject to a form of moral relativism, such that the morally
good action is defined in relation to the available alternatives.
In the experiment, being given the opportunity to do a bad thing, such as taking money from a charity, and not taking this
opportunity is itself viewed as a good thing, and good to a sufficient degree such that subjects feel less need to make what are
inconsequential donations. Expanding the lower bound of the choice set means any given donation is further away from the1 Luccasen and Grossman (2013) report a behaviourally similar design, expect that subjects’ income is crowded out if they take from the charity. Even in the
absence of a financial incentive to take, they still find reduced allocations in their give/take treatment.
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being similar to lowering the price of morality, meaning that any given level of experienced warm glow can be achieved with
a lower donation in the give/take treatment than in the give treatment. In this sense, expanding the choice set alters the
morality of any absolute action, which acts as a disconnect between behavioural and experienced warm glow.
In Section 5 we argue that given the positive correlation between behavioural and experienced warm glow, their counter-
directional changes across the treatments are inconsistent with alternative explanations such as experimenter demand
effects or an inherent middle bias. The moral relativism interpretation we report not only describes the nature of the beha-
vioural and experienced warm glow relationship, but also offers an explanation for the menu independence violations
observed in other allocation type games.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews much of the relevant previous literature, concentrating
on both field and experimental evidence for warm glow preferences, measures and effects of experienced warm glow and the
implications of choice sets on decisions. Section 3 describes the specifics of the experimental design. Section 4 outlines the
results. And in Section 5 we discuss our interpretation of these results, in the form of a desire by subjects to make moral
choices, the definition of which are subject to comparisons made against the available options. We conclude in Section 6
and discuss the implications of our results for the falsifiability of the transitivity axiom.
2. Previous literature
Evidence for warm glow preferences often takes the form of lack of evidence for the alternative, namely the failure to
observe the implications of altruistic preferences. Andreoni (1988) shows that in a public good model, consequentialist moti-
vations for giving imply that as the economy becomes large the fraction of individuals making voluntary contributions
approaches zero. Yet for the US, data on the prevalence of donators seems to refute this, with estimates generally above
two thirds.2 However, the major failing of the altruistic formulation of utility, and the initial motivation for the warm glow
alternative, is the failure to observe complete crowding out.
Section 2.1 reviews the empirical literature on crowding out, both the initial work based on field data and the subsequent
experimental studies. Section 2.2 outlines research on experienced warm glow using both self-reported and neuroscientific
measures and shows how these measures are connected and how they affect behaviour. While Section 2.3 concludes this
section by examining the literature related to menu effects, both generally and more specifically for allocation experiments.
2.1. Behavioural warm glow
Field data studies on crowding out generally take the form of estimates of the effect of government grants on individuals’
donations. While their results vary widely, these studies all categorically reject the complete crowding prediction of altru-
istic preferences, with most finding only partial crowding out but some finding none or even crowding in. In the first study to
use individual data, Kingma (1989) uses a single cross section of contributions to public radio stations, finding that income
from other sources significantly crowds out individual donations by 13%. However, using the same methodology on a similar
data set, Manzoor and Straub (2005) find no significant crowding out for donations to public radio.
Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) use US panel data on individuals’ donations to international development charities, estimating
significant crowding out of 13% for government contributions and 5% for contributions from other organisations.3 Khanna,
Posnett, and Sandler (1995) use similar longitudinal data for individuals’ donations to various UK charities, they find no evi-
dence for crowding out but, for some charity sectors, significant estimates of government crowding in. Okten and Weisbrod
(2000) find comparable results of no crowding out but some significant crowding in for US longitudinal data on donations to
domestic non-profit organisations.
Payne (1998) argues that direct correlations of the type outlined above suffer from a possible endogeneity problem that
underestimates the degree of crowding out. Using instrumental variables to control for this, she estimates a figure of 50%
crowding out for US government grants to domestic charities. Yet even with partial crowding out it is still possible that pref-
erences are completely non-consequentialist. Andreoni and Payne (2011) illustrate this point with panel data for donations
to domestic US charities, estimating a figure of 76% crowding out for government grants. However, they decompose this fig-
ure into crowding out stemming from donator preferences and crowding out stemming from charities’ reduced fund raising,
concluding that all of the crowding out comes from a fall in fund raising activity.4
A number of studies have used experiments to examine the issue of crowding out and act vs. outcome preferences. Bolton
and Katok (1998) use a between subject variation of the dictator game, where $20 is initially distributed between dictator
and recipient in two different ways. In the first treatment dictators begin with $15 and recipients with $5, whereas in the
second treatment dictators begin with $18 and recipients with $2. Allocations are higher in the 18=2 treatment, but signif-
icantly less than the $3 difference implied by consequential altruistic preferences, with partial crowding out of 74%.2 Mayr, Harbaugh, and Tankersley (2009) cite a figure of 89% of US households making charitable donations in 2003. Andreoni (2006) cites a comparable
figure of 68% for 1995.
3 See Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), Table 2, column e.
4 See Andreoni and Payne (2011), Table 5, column 1.
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tions almost identical in each treatment and an insignificant level of crowding out of only 3%. In a second version where dic-
tators are told that from an initial allocation of $20 the charity has received a tax of either $5 or $2, crowding out increases to
almost 100%. Carpenter, Liati, and Vickery (2010) report a similar design where in the first treatment dictators begin with
$20 and recipients with zero, whereas in the second treatment both dictators and recipients are each endowed with $20.
The results suggest zero crowding out, with more people sending more money in the second treatment. Andreoni (1993)
applies the same methodology of altering initial endowments between otherwise identical treatments by shifting the payoff
matrix in a public good game. Results indicate significant partial crowding out of 71%. In Andreoni (1995) he varies the frame
rather than the initial endowments, where results from a standard public good game are compared with those from a con-
sequentially identical, but differently framed, negative public good game. Preferences over outcomes would predict identical
contributions in each case, whereas they are significantly lower in the negative public good game, consistent with a prefer-
ence for the perception of giving.
2.2. Experienced warm glow
In Section 5 we argue that behaviour in our experiment is motivated by a desire to act morally which creates positive
emotions, which we describe as experienced warm glow. This subsection outlines some of the literature that relates to emo-
tion’s role in moral judgments and their subsequent effect on behaviour. Early work in moral psychology was characterised
by a reasoned, rationalist approach whereby moral judgments (i.e. whether an action is morally good or bad) were arrived at
via conscious, contemplative deliberation. However, more recent work has emphasised the importance of both emotions and
instinctive reactions.
Haidt (2001, 2007) incorporates these developments into moral psychology in his social intuitionist model of moral judg-
ments, which distinguishes between moral intuition, defined as rapid, emotion driven, instinctive responses, and moral rea-
soning, defined as conscious, rational, deliberation. He concludes that it is moral intuitions that are the major determinant
behind moral judgments, with moral reasoning often applied after the fact in order to justify decisions.
Much of the evidence cited for this conclusion comes from neuroscience.5 Using fMRI techniques it is possible to associate
subjects’ decisions or responses to stimuli with changes in activity in different areas of the brain. Moll et al. (2006) demonstrate
a measurable physiological basis for experienced warm glow that is comparable to that of receiving money. They use a variation
of the charity dictator game to show increased activity in the ventral striatum, a reward centre associated with the control of
dopamine, when subjects receive money for themselves but also similar increases when subjects give money to charity.
In a further variation on the charity dictator game, Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007) illustrate the importance of
responsibility for an outcome, in the form of the additional emotional payoff warm glow preferences have over altruistic
ones. In the voluntary trials, subjects choose to accept or reject various charitable donations of a pre-determined size. In
the mandatory trials, equivalently sized donations are imposed on the subjects’ endowments. After controlling for income,
voluntary donations produced significantly higher activity in the ventral striatum than comparable mandatory donations
with identical outcomes. Furthermore, self-reported satisfaction is significantly higher in the voluntary trials than in com-
parable mandatory ones, suggesting that self-reports can be a valid proxy for measures of experienced warm glow.
The importance of emotions as a cause of moral decision making, as opposed to just a consequence of it, is illustrated by
Greene, Sommweville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001). In their experiment subjects listened to numerous pairs of moral
dilemmas, with either a personal or impersonal frame, where each pair had the same consequentialist outcome.6 Their
results show that regions associated with emotions are significantly more active in the personal frame than the impersonal
frame and that subjects are more likely to rate the impersonal frame as morally appropriate. In the personal frame subjects took
significantly longer to rate the dilemma as appropriate rather than inappropriate, whereas in the impersonal frame response
times were equal. Greene et al. argue that the higher neurological emotional activity and inappropriate ratings in the personal
frame are evidence for emotions having a causal influence on moral judgments, whereby the longer response time is explained
by the cognitive dissonance arising from contradictory moral intuitions (e.g. pushing a stranger from a bridge is murder) and
moral reasoning (e.g. one death is better than five).
Some confirmation of Greene et al.’s (2001) results and their interpretation is provided by Koenigs et al. (2007), who
undertake the same experiment but use subjects with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), an area asso-
ciated with the processing of emotions. Compared to a control group of subjects without brain damage, those with VMPC
damage were significantly more likely to give the consequentialist answer in the personal frame but were no more likely
to give either answer in the impersonal frame. The authors conclude that the higher incidence of utilitarian answers results
from the inability of the VMPC damaged subjects to experience moral emotions.
Outside of experiments, Ferguson, Farrell, and Lawrence (2008) show how self-reported personal benefit can predict char-
itable behaviour. Participants were asked to rate the degree to which donating blood benefitted both society and the donor.5 See Greene and Haidt (2002), Mayr et al. (2009) and Moll, Zahn, De Oliveria-Souza, Krueger, and Grafman (2005) for reviews of these issues.
6 The dilemmas were variations of the‘‘trolley problem”. A trolley is travelling along a track towards five people, who will be killed if the trolley hits them. In
the impersonal frame, the only way to save the five is by deploying a switch that reroutes the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will hit one person,
who will be killed. In the personal frame, the only way to save the five is to push a stranger from a bridge onto the tracks in front of the trolley. The stranger will
be killed. In terms of utilitarian calculus, both frames are identical: kill one, to save five.
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association to a belief in societal benefit. Hence, here self-reported warm glow predicts blood donation but self-reported
altruism does not.
2.3. Menu effects
The property of menu independent preferences, derived from the transitivity axiom, is one of the major implications of
rational choice theory. For choice, the property can be characterised by the conditions of expansion consistency, whereby if
only a is chosen from fa; bg then b is not chosen from fa; b; c; . . .g, and contraction consistency, whereby if only a is chosen
from fa; b; c; . . .g then b is not chosen from fa; bg. However, numerous experimental results have indicated clear, systematic
violations of menu independence in domains such as consumer goods and risk.
For choices involving multi-attributed consumer durables, Simonson (1989), Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Tversky
and Simonson (1993) show that when evaluating the trade-off between price and quality a middle bias, which they refer to
as a ‘‘compromise effect” or ‘‘extremeness aversion”, can occur. In a series of experiments involving both hypothetical and
incentivised choices, their results show that the proportion of subjects choosing x2 is significantly higher in the ordered
choice set fx1; x2; x3g than in the set fx1; x2g.
Birnbaum (1992), Stewart, Charter, Stott, and Reimers (2003), Vlaev, Charter, and Stewart (2006), and Vlaev, Charter, and
Stewart (2007) all document similar evidence for a distinct middle bias when choosing from an ordered set for decisions
involving risk. Their experimental designs are variations on the choice between a binary lottery (e.g. L ¼ fz; p;0; ð1 pÞg)
and its minimum certainty equivalent amount, chosen from a subset of an ordered set of options, where either z; p or the
subset of certainty equivalent options is varied between treatments. In all of their variations, the results indicate a strong
bias for the middle options and in some cases choices can be explained entirely by the certainty equivalent’s position in
the choice set with no role for its absolute value.
For allocative choices, both Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) report evidence suggestive of a middle bias in dictator games.
However, in neither case is expansion consistency technically violated, as there is no significant increase in the proportion of
subjects choosing an option in the expanded treatment that was available in the baseline.7 In Bardsley’s (2008) version of this
design, dictators and recipients each initially receive a £4 show up fee with dictators endowed with a further £7. In the give
treatment dictators can give all, part or none of their endowment to the recipients, whereas in the give/take treatment the
choice set is expanded to allow them to take up to £2 of the recipients’ show up fee. In the give treatment 70% of dictators give
positive amounts but this figure is significantly lower at 47% in the give/take treatment.
List (2007) also finds a similar middle bias in his design, which expands the above to three treatments with the choice set
extended in the take direction each time. In all treatments dictators are initially endowed with $10 and recipients with $5. In
the give treatment dictators’ choice sets vary from $0 to $5, in the take$1 treatment their choice set is extended to the range
$1 to $5 and in the take$5 treatment it is extended further to $5 to $5. Positive allocations fall significantly each time from
71% to 35% to 10%, respectively. Hence, for consumer durables, risk and, albeit insignificantly, allocations to others, there is
evidence of violations of the expansion/contraction consistency conditions, and for ordered choice sets a prominent bias
toward the middle options and away from corner solutions.
3. Experiment
Our experimental design uses a between subject, crowded-out charity dictator game with two treatments. Both treat-
ments are identical aside from a variation in the choice set. The experiment was run using subjects recruited from the stu-
dent population at the University of Nottingham.8 Subjects were randomly allocated between the two treatments and each
subject participated individually, resulting in 74 sessions with 37 subjects in each treatment. Each session lasted approximately
20 minutes, with a mean payment of £4.61 per subject.
Sessions began with subjects answering three questionnaires, followed by the crowded-out dictator game and ending
with the post-decision measures of experienced warm glow.9 The surveys consisted of a set of questions relating to partici-
pants’ demographics and their past experiences with charities, and two personality surveys, one measuring empathy and the
other alexithymia. The experimental task was split into two parts and involved two separate decisions.
In part one, subjects were asked to choose a charity from a list of ten, on the understanding that their chosen charity
would be provisionally allocated a £2 donation which was referred to as the‘‘experimenter donation”. In part two, subjects
received £5, a £3 show up fee and a £2 ‘‘participation fee” made up of ten £0.2 coins. In the give treatment, subjects were
given the opportunity to donate all, part or none of their £2 participation fee to the charity they had selected in part one,
on the understanding that any donation they made from their participation fee would result in an equal sized reduction
in the experimenter donation, such that irrespective of their decision their chosen charity would always receive exactly7 The results of both Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) can technically be explained by non-monotonic preferences over others’ income and are therefore
consistent with rational choice.
8 Subjects were recruited using ORSEE – Greiner (2004).
9 A full set of instructions are available in Appendix A.
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donation would fall to £0.8 and the charity would receive a total of £1.2 plus £0.8.
In the give/take treatment the options available to subjects were expanded so that they were also able to take all, part or
none of the experimenter donation for themselves. As in the give treatment, any amount they gave was completely crowded
out by an equivalent fall in the experimenter donation. However, taking from the experimenter donation was not subject to
crowding in. For example, if a subject took £1.2 from the experimenter donation then this would fall to £0.8 and the charity
would receive a total of £0.8. A set of control questions were included, which asked subjects to state final outcomes for the
charity and subject for some hypothetical choices. Subjects who answered one or more of these questions incorrectly were
asked to reread the instructions and attempt the questions again.10
Allocation decisions were made in private. Subjects were given two envelopes, one labelled ‘‘charity” and the other
labelled ‘‘keep”. The charity envelope contained the provisional experimenter donation in the form of ten £0.2 coins. In
the give treatment, subjects were instructed to place any amount of their participation fee they wanted to donate to the
charity into the charity envelope and place the remainder into the keep envelope. In the give/take treatment, subjects were
given the additional option of taking any amount from the charity envelope and placing it in the keep envelope.
Subjects then completed the measures for experienced warm glow, which involved stating the extent to which various
types of positive affect could explain their allocation decision. The question asked: ‘‘Why did you choose to divide the money
between yourself and your charity in the way you did?”. Subjects were instructed to consider three possible answers – ‘‘It made
me feel good about myself”, ‘‘It made me feel emotionally positive about myself” and ‘‘It left me with a feeling warm glow inside”11
– rating each one on a Likert-type scale ranging from (1) ‘‘Not at all” to (7) ‘‘Completely”.12 They then left the experiment taking
the keep envelope with them.
4. Results
36 male and 38 female subjects ranging in age from 18 to 32 years old were randomly allocated between the two treat-
ments. This gave similar gender and age profiles for each treatment: 17/37 male, mean age 19.7 and 19/37 male, mean age
20.2 years in the give and give/take treatments, respectively. Table 1 summarises the results from the crowded-out charity
dictator game for each of the treatments. Both treatments show significant levels of behavioural warm glow. In the give
treatment, 54% of subjects sent positive amounts to the charity, with a mean allocation of 27% of the endowment. These fig-
ures are comparable to the 57% of subjects giving positive amounts and a mean allocation of 21% of the endowment, found by
Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In the give/take treatment allocations fell significantly: 27% of subjects gave positive allo-
cations with a mean allocation of 12% of the endowment.
Fig. 1 outlines the distributions in each treatment. Given the opportunity, only one subject chose to take money from the
charity’s provisional experimenter donation, taking £1 for themselves. However, the inclusion of the take option still resulted
in a significant fall in behavioural warm glow. Using a binary categorisation of coding subjects as exhibiting behavioural
warm glow if they make positive allocations and not otherwise, a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test has z = 2.352 and
p = 0.019. Similar results, of a fall in average behavioural warm glow, are found using the full allocation results of units given
– z = 2.205 and p = 0.027.13
The proportion of subjects choosing an allocation of zero is also significantly higher in the give/take treatment (70%) than
in the give treatment (46%) – z = 2.10 and p = 0.036. This significant increase is a violation of expansion consistency and,
given any conventional outcome based formulation of utility, a failure of the transitivity axiom. Although not reported here,
a number of regressions, which controlled for various demographics and personality measures, resulted in the same conclu-
sion of significantly lower behavioural warm glow in the give/take treatment.14
For experienced warm glow, the three measures ranged from one to seven with higher values representing higher
experienced warm glow. Comparing the distributions of experienced warm glow across the treatments shows that subjects
experienced higher warm glow in the give/take treatment than in the give treatment. The three Mann–Whitney rank-sum
tests have z = 2.741 and p = 0.006, z = 0.489 and p = 0.625, and z = 0.578 and p = 0.563, for good about self, emotionally positive
and warm inside, respectively.15 By assuming cardinality in the answers, we can sum them so as to create a single aggregate10 Two subjects answered one or more of the control questions incorrectly on their first attempt. However, both of these subjects answered all of the control
questions correctly on their second attempt.
11 A fourth possible answer, ‘‘I would feel guilty if I didn’t” was also included. However, as opposed to the other three measures, this question asks for an
assessment of emotion if subjects had made a different decision. Consequently, it cannot be included as a measure of experienced warm glow.
12 Ferguson, Taylor, Keatley, Flynn, and Lawrence (2012) find that answers to these questions are positively correlated with allocations in standard charity
dictator games.
13 For the treatments to be comparable in this particular test, the one subject in the give/take treatment who took £1 is coded as giving zero, rather than 100.
This imposes identical censoring of 0 and 200 in both treatments.
14 With either units given or the binary measure of behavioural warm glow as the dependent variable, regressed on the treatment, empathy and alexithymia
scores, and various demographics such as age, gender and religious beliefs and experience, only the treatment variable proved to be significant.
15 The equivalent figures for guilt are z = 2.203 and p = 0.028.
Table 1
Average allocations by treatment.
Treatment Behavioural warm glow (%) Mean allocation Median allocation
Give 54 £0.54 £0.20
Give/take 27 £0.27 £0.00
Fig. 1. Allocations by treatment.
Fig. 2. Aggregate experienced warm glow by treatment.
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sure shows significantly higher experienced warm glow in the give/take treatment than in the give treatment – give treatment
mean = 10.595, give/take treatment mean = 12.270, t = 1.668, p = 0.099.16 Fig. 2 outlines the distributions of the three question
aggregate measure of experienced warm glow in each treatment.
Table 2 shows the treatment effect on experienced warm glow, while controlling for the higher monetary allocations in
the give treatment.17 The Treatment variable is a dummy taking a value of 0 for the give treatment and 1 for the give/take treat-
ment. In all four variations the results show significantly higher experience warm glow in the give/take treatment for any given
monetary allocation to the charity. We control for the allocation to the charity with the variable Units given and an interaction
between Units given and the Treatment variable.18 The results show a positive correlation between behavioural and experienced
warm glow within each treatment. Additionally, the negative coefficients for the interaction term show a lower correlation
between behavioural and experienced warm glow in the give/take treatment than in the give treatment, suggesting that an
additional unit of experienced warm glow ‘‘costs” more in the give/take treatment than in the give treatment.16 Based on the results of a punishment variation of the dictator game, Eckel and Grossman (1996) argue that men exhibit a more absolute sense of morality,
whereas women seem more context dependent. In repeating our behavioural and experienced warm glow tests separately for each gender, we find the same
directional changes for both men and women and no significant differences in the scale of these effects.
17 Extending these regressions to include controls for demographics, alexithymia and empathy, results in similar conclusions, with the additional controls
being insignificant.
18 The variable Units given is measured at the level of number of £0.2 coins.
Table 2
Experienced warm glow regressions.
1. Good about self 2. Emotionally positive 3. Warm inside 4. Aggregate experienced warm glow (1 + 2 + 3)
Treatment 2.288 1.042 1.147 3.749
(0.000) (0.043) (0.036) (0.001)
Units given 0.374 0.346 0.312 0.870
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Treatment ⁄ units given 0.291 0.224 0.277 0.661
(0.070) (0.122) (0.052) (0.044)
(Pseudo) R2 0.086 0.053 0.039 0.237
Notes: n ¼ 74 in all columns. Initial figures are estimated coefficients, with p values in parentheses. Columns 1–3 are ordered logits, column 4 is OLS. Bottom
row gives pseudo R2 for columns 1–3 and R2 for column 4.
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Section 4 outlines three main results: (i) a positive correlation between behavioural and experienced warm glow in each
treatment, with a higher correlation in the give treatment than in the give/take treatment; (ii) a decrease in behavioural
warm glow in the give/take treatment; and (iii) an increase in experienced warm glow in the give/take treatment.
This section outlines some of the previous explanations for why changes in the choice set can lead to violations of expan-
sion consistency in allocation games. It also describes some alternative accounts for the behavioural warm glow interpreta-
tion of the crowded-out charity dictator game. Issues such as status quo aversion, an intrinsic middle bias and experimenter
demand effects are all possible reasons for our behavioural results. However, we argue that the best fit for our data is a utility
function increasing in both income and morality, where the payoff from morality is experienced warm glow and the moral
act is defined in relation to the available alternatives.
Carpenter et al. (2010) present evidence suggesting subjects in dictator games can be characterised by a form of status
quo aversion, where given the choice between an active (i.e. giving) and a passive (i.e. doing nothing) alternative there is
a tendency to prefer the active option. Applied to our baseline treatment, this would suggest that giving to the charity rep-
resents a preference for action rather than a preference for giving per se. However, such an interpretation is inconsistent with
the subsequent fall in active choices in the give/take treatment. A further critique of the behavioural warm glow interpre-
tation, raised by Crumpler and Grossman (2008) and examined by Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2014), is that subjects might
have altruistic distributional preferences over the experimenter’s budget. Again, if this was the only explanation there should
be no decrease in charitable donations in response to the addition of the take option. Hence, the treatment effect gives some
weight to the warm glow preferences interpretation of the crowded-out dictator game.
The literature on menu effects, reviewed in Section 2.3, largely concludes that when faced with an ordered choice set
there is a tendency to prefer the middle options. Why this occurs is often explained as a form of hedging between multiple
attribute goods. However, studies examining choices between identical options, which should result in uniform distributions
if the indifferent choose randomly, find the same bias. Christenfeld (1995) shows that in rows of adjacent supermarket
shelves stocking an identical product, the middle shelves are restocked a disproportionally large number of times compared
to the end shelves. He records a similar result in an experiment where subjects are asked to circle one X in a row of four Xs
(i.e. X X X X). 71% chose one of the two middle Xs. Attali and Bar-Hillel (2003) note the same bias in multiple-choice exams,
where answers B and C account for a disproportionally large number of incorrect answers to ordered four-option questions
of the type A, B, C or D.
These results suggest that any bias for the middle options is to an extent unconscious and in some sense intrinsic, requir-
ing no further explanation based on deliberation or maximisation. Applying such a bias to our experiment could explain both
the existence of positive allocations in the give treatment and their subsequent fall in the give/take treatment. However, an
intrinsic middle bias cannot explain the rise in experienced warm glow when the choice set is expanded in the allocation
game, given that the choice set that records experienced warm glow is constant across the treatments – i.e. one to seven
each time.
The same argument can be used to question experimenter demand as the sole explanation for the treatment effects.
Experimenter demand can be loosely defined as subjects undertaking behaviour they believe to be appropriate in terms
of the experimenter’s expectations, where expectations are taken from cues in the design. In our experiment, the change
in the choice set could be interpreted as a change in the cues. Hence, such a process may be a plausible explanation for
the fall in donations between the treatments, and is in fact the explanation favoured by Bardsley (2008). However, given
the between subject design and the consistent framing of the experience measures across the treatments, it is far from clear
what cues subjects might be adhering to that would lead them to report an increase in experienced warm glow in the give/-
take treatment.
Our preferred explanation for the results is to model utility as an increasing function of both money and morality, similar
to the function proposed by Levitt and List (2007). In our version, the payoff from undertaking the moral action is a sense of
having done the right, good or virtuous thing, creating a positive self-image, which we label experienced warm glow. Hence,
in the give treatment money is traded for a positive emotional payoff in the form of donations to charity. However, such a
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warm glow across the treatments. For this, we propose that what defines experienced warm glow is subject to a degree
of a particular form of moral relativism, where the moral action is defined relative to the alternative options. Here, morality
becomes less an issue of good or bad and more an issue of better or worse, in that the best possible action is perceived as
morally good and the worst possible action as morally bad.
Applying such a process to the treatments means that any given absolute action is relatively further away from the worst
possible action and relatively closer to the best possible action when the choice set is expanded solely in a negative direction.
As such, any given absolute action, such as donating nothing to the charity, results in higher experienced warm glow in the
give/take treatment than it does in the give treatment. This increase in emotional payoffs is equivalent to a fall in the price of
experienced warm glow and with appropriately defined convex preferences for money and morality will result in greater
consumption of each.
Evidence for a more conventional form of moral relativism, where morality is judged relative to the actions of others
rather than the choice set, is given in Cubitt, Drouvelis, Gachter, and Kabalin (2011). In their experiment, subjects rate
the morality of a free rider in a simultaneous two-person public good game for differing contributions from the other player.
The aggregate results show the free rider rated as being significantly less moral the more the other player contributed.
Parducci (1968) shows similar evidence of moral judgments being dependent on context. Again, subjects rated the morality
of different acts in two treatments, one where most of the acts were mild (e.g. fishing without a licence) and the other where
most were more severe (e.g. murdering your mother). Acts that appeared in both lists were all rated worse in the mild list
than they were in the severe list, consistent with morality being defined relative to other salient acts.
In modelling morality as being defined relative to the choice set, we use the range principle taken from Parducci’s (1965)
Range Frequency Theory (RFT). This was initially developed as a model of perception, rather than value, and proposes that
judgments of magnitudes are made in relation to the relevant context. It consists of a weighted average of the range prin-
ciple, an element’s proportional distance along the range of context, and the frequency principle, its ordinal ranking within
the range. As the frequency principle is normalised for one and as the choice sets we use all have constantly spaced options
of £0.2 then only the range principle will apply in our context.19 To introduce moral relativism to the decision process, we
define utility as an additively separable, increasing function of both wealth and morality, where morality is measured in units
of experienced warm glow:19 An
would p
Brown,
quit.
20 An
such as
used in
additiveUi ¼ f ðe xiÞ þ gðwiÞ ð1Þ
where e is an individual’s endowment, xi is the amount they donate to charity, and wi is their level of experienced warm
glow. Both wealth and morality are subject to either constant or diminishing marginal utility:f 0 > 0; f 00 6 0; g0 > 0; and g00 6 0 ð2Þ
with at least one of them being strictly concave to allow for unique interior solutions, such that:@2U
@x2i
< 0 ð3ÞApplying the range principle to the definition of experienced warm glow, gives morality as a function of the allocation
made to the charity and the maximum and minimum possible donations, where allocations are made from an ordered
set x, such that: x ¼ fxmin; . . . ; xmaxg. This gives20:wi ¼ wðxi; xmin; xmaxÞ ¼ xi  xminxmax  xmin ð4Þwhich has partial derivatives:@wi
@xi
¼ 1
xmax  xmin > 0 ð5Þ
@2wi
@xi@xmin
¼ 1
ðxmax  xminÞ2
> 0 ð6Þ
@wi
@xmin
¼ xi  xmax
ðxmax  xminÞ2
6 0 ð7Þalternative to RFT is Helson’s (1964) Adaptation Level Theory (ALT), where judgments of magnitudes are made in relation to a weighted mean. This
roduce similar results in our case but empirical evidence suggests RFT is often a better fit. When applied to data on within-firm wage distributions,
Gardner, Oswald, and Qian (2008) find RFT outperforms ALT in predicting both employees’ self-reported satisfaction with pay and their probability to
alternative formulation for wi , using ALT, could be the absolute difference between the amount given and a, possibly weighted, average of the choice set,
: wi ¼ xi  k xmaxþxmin2
 
, where 0 < k 6 1. Here, k measures the degree of relativity in experienced warm glow, a concept missing from the formulation
(4), which assumes that wi is defined in an entirely relative sense with no role for the absolute level of xi . However, applying the ALT formulation to the
ly separable function in (1) requires that g00 < 0, in order to replicate the dxi =dxmin > 0 treatment effect.
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(6) states that the positive correlation between experienced warm glow and the amount given to charity is higher for choice
sets with higher minimum options, and (7) states that, for any given donation, experienced warm glow is higher the lower is
the minimum option in the choice set. Hence, (5)–(7) give the empirical results outlined in Table 2 of a positive correlation
between behavioural and experienced warm glow within each treatment, a lower positive correlation in the give/take treat-
ment than in the give treatment, and higher experienced warm glow in the give/take treatment holding the level of chari-
table donation constant.
The treatment effect on behavioural warm glow, whereby the addition of the take option reduces donations, can be
shown formally as the sign of dxi =dxmin, where x

i is the optimal allocation and the solution to the first order condition of
(1). The implicit differentiation of this first order condition gives:21 (8)
dxi =dxm
change
margin
22 Intu
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dwi =dxdxi
dxmin
¼
1
ðxmaxxminÞ2
g0ðwiÞ þ xixmaxðxmaxxminÞ g00ðwiÞ
h i
@2U=@x2i
> 0 ð8ÞThe denominator in (8) is the second order condition of (1), which is assumed negative in (3) so as to achieve a unique max-
imum. The first term in the numerator is negative while the second bracketed term is positive. With both denominator and
numerator negative, dxi =dxmin is positive, implying that a fall in the lowest option in the choice set, such as the addition of
the take option, results in a fall in charitable allocations.21 Hence, the utility function given in (1) combined with the morally
relative definition of experienced warm glow given in (4) are able to explain the fall in charitable donations observed in the
give/take treatment outlined in Section 4.
The treatment effect on experienced warm glow, where the addition of the take option increases the post-decision self-
reports of positive affect, can be shown formally as the sign of dwi =dxmin, wherew

i is the value of wi given the optimal dona-
tion xi found from the solution to the optimisation of (1). For the function and constraints defined in (1)–(3), the sign of
dwi =dxmin is ambiguous. We illustrate this result by way of an example, which uses a simple parametric function, nested
in (1), assuming an iso-elastic function for f ðe xiÞ and linearity in gðwiÞ.22 This gives a utility function of:Ui ¼ a ðe xiÞ
1/
1 / þ ð1 aÞwi ð9Þwhere / > 0; /– 1 and 0 < a < 1. The solution to the first order condition of (9) gives an explicit function for xi . Substitut-
ing this expression into (4) gives wi , which is the equilibrium value of experienced warm glow, and differentiating w

i with
respect to xmin gives:dwi
dxmin
¼
1/
/
a
1a ðxmax  xminÞ
 1
/ þ e xmax
ðxmax  xminÞ2
ð10Þwhere (10) measures the change in equilibrium warm glow in response to a change in the minimum available option in the
choice set. For our results, experienced warm glow is higher in the give/take treatment, implying that dwi =dxmin < 0. The sign
of (10), however, is undetermined and depends on the specific parameter values in (9) and the scale of the choice set. The
sign of dwi =dxmin is given by the sign of the numerator in (10). If we interpret e as the endowment in the experiment, such
that e ¼ xmax, then the sign of dwi =dxmin is determined entirely by the value of /, which measures the elasticity of the mar-
ginal utility of income or, for risk, the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Here, / > 1 is sufficient for dwi =dxmin < 0 and a rise
in aggregate experienced warm glow in the give/take treatment.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we examine further the nature of warm glow preferences, how this behaviour is related to experienced pos-
itive affect, and what effect the choice set has on this relationship. We extend the crowded-out charity dictator game of
Crumpler and Grossman (2008) by including a second treatment with the additional option of taking money from the char-
ity, and also by the inclusion of a series of self-reported measures of positive affect, labelled experienced warm glow. This
gives three main results: (i) within each treatment behavioural warm glow is positively correlated with experienced warm
glow, such that the more money subjects donate to the charity, the better they claim to feel about themselves; (ii) beha-
vioural warm glow is reduced by extending the choice set in a negative direction, in that the addition of the take option low-assumes and holds for interior solutions. For the inclusion of corner solutions, the strict inequality is replaced by a weak inequality, such that
in P 0. For example, consider the solution xi ¼ xmax in the give treatment, here a rise or fall in xmin results in no change in wi , and subsequently no
in xi . For the alternative corner solution x

i ¼ xmin, a fall in xmin results in a rise in wi , and with g00 6 0, this gives either a decrease or no change in the
al utility of donations and subsequently a decrease or no change in xi .
itively, there seems no a priori reason to believe that w should be subject to diminishing marginal value. Given the abstract nature of experienced warm
d the absence of any identifiable conceptual upper or lower bounds, arguments for diminishing marginal value based on perception and comparisons to
em invalid in this case. In (9), however, we assume linearity merely for simplicity. It is not a necessary condition, given (1), for the replication of the
min < 0 treatment effect.
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option, both holding donations constant and at the aggregate level.
These results are inconsistent with a purely experimenter demand effect or an intrinsic middle bias explanation for the
observed expansion inconsistency, as neither of these would predict a treatment effect for experienced warm glow. In (i) the
positive correlation between charitable allocations and positive affect is consistent with the implicit motivation expressed
within the ‘‘warm glow” label, yet in of itself implies no direction for the causality of this relationship. Similarly, in (ii) the
positive allocations in the crowded-out dictator game and their violation of expansion consistency when the choice set is
expanded merely represent anomalies to conventional theory when viewed in isolation. Yet when (i) and (ii) are viewed
simultaneously, together with the counter-directional treatment effect for experience warm glow in (iii), they offer a more
coherent and somewhat more rational explanation for both behavioural warm glow and the apparent failure of expansion
consistency.
In our model behavioural warm glow is driven by an individuals desire for acting morally, measured by experienced
warm glow, which is simply treated as a good to be bought through the medium of charitable donations. Given such pref-
erences, the treatment effects in (ii) and (iii) occur entirely through the relativistic, menu-dependent definition of experi-
enced warm glow, which we describe as a form of moral relativism. Here, the morality of an action, and its subsequent
level of experienced warm glow, depends not only on the option chosen but also on other options that were available but
were not chosen. In the context of the experiment, being given the opportunity to take money from a charity and refraining
from taking this opportunity creates an additional amount of experienced warm glow compared to the same action under-
taken when the taking option is unavailable. Such a concept of morality, where foregone opportunities form part of the def-
inition, is one of the defining features in much of the theoretical literature on reciprocity. For example, in both Rabin (1993)
and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) players seek to match the kindness of others in strategic situations. Here kindness is
not only a function of actions but also of foregone opportunities and is defined in comparison to the upper and lower bounds
in some subset of the choice set.
With such a relativistic definition of morality, individuals that seek to maximise preferences defined over the goods of
money and morality can have less incentive to make positive charitable donations once the choice set is extended in a neg-
ative direction. These relationships produce intransitivity in the observable action of charitable donations, yet this apparent
intransitivity is derived from a set of transitive preferences defined over the two goods of money and morality. It is ques-
tionable whether such preferences can really be termed irrational or inconsistent. Given the abstract nature of experienced
warm glow and its inability to be commodified and resold, it is not obvious how a relativistic definition of morality could be
exploited within a market through a money-pump type argument.
In a wider context, our results highlight a problem in the capacity of observed choices to reveal preferences. They raise the
question of what exactly is being chosen under observed choice? Is the observed chosen element a good in itself or is it just a
single element in a multi-element good? Both Anand (1990) and Sen (1993, 1997) show that without a definitive answer to
this question the transitive preferences axiom becomes practically unfalsifiable, in that if you allow for the existence of menu
dependent goods then any pattern of seemingly intransitive choices can be described by a set of transitive preferences, as
long as the menu dependence is defined appropriately. The patterns observed in our results suggest that utility can be
derived from foregone opportunities and that menu dependent goods do exist.
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Appendix A. Instructions
The experimental task includes decisions both about charities and monetary charitable donations. The task is in two parts
and involves two separate decisions.
A.1. Part One
You are required to choose one charity from a list of ten different charities. The charity you choose will be provisionally
allocated a £2.00 donation which we will send to your chosen charity once all sessions of this experiment are complete. This
provisional donation is referred to as the ‘‘experimenter donation”.
Please choose the charity that you want to receive the experimenter donation. Highlight your choice by circling one of the
following charities:
 Amnesty International
 UNICEF
 British Heart Foundation
 Help the Aged
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 Save the Children
 Oxfam
 Asthma UK
 Barnados
A.2. Part Two
(Instructions for the give treatment are in standard font, instructions for the give/take treatment are in both standard and bold
font.)
For participating in this study you will be paid a total of £5.00. This includes a £3.00 show up fee and a £2.00 participation
fee. This £2.00 is referred to as ‘‘your participation fee”. The choice you face in Part Two involves decisions regarding both
‘‘your participation fee” and the ‘‘experimenter donation”.
The choice you face in Part Two is to decide how much of your participation fee you wish to donate to the charity you
chose in Part One and how much you wish to keep for yourself, or how much of the experimenter donation you wish
to take for yourself and how much you wish to leave for the charity you chose in Part One. You can choose to donate
or keep all, part or none of your participation fee. Or, you can choose to take or leave all, part or none of the experimenter
donation.
However, note that donating to the charity and taking from the experimenter donation both have the same effect on
the size of the experimenter donation. That is, any donation you make to your nominated charity from your participation
fee will result in an equal sized reduction in the size of the experimenter donation. Similarly, any money you take from the
experimenter donation will result in an equal sized reduction in the size of the experimenter donation.
For example, if you decide to donate £2.00 and keep none of your participation fee, then the experimenter donation is
reduced by £2.00; if you decide to donate £1.00 and keep £1.00, then the experimenter donation is reduced by £1.00; or
if you decide to donate nothing and keep £2.00, then the experimenter donation is not reduced.
Similarly, if you decide to take £2.00 and leave none of the experimenter donation, then the experimenter donation
is reduced by £2.00; if you decide to take £1.00 and leave £1.00, then the experimenter donation is reduced by £1.00; or
if you decide to take nothing and leave £2.00, then the experimenter donation is not reduced.
The net effect of this is that if you take money from the experimenter donation then we will send your nominated
charity whatever remains of the experimenter donation. However, if you do not take money from the experimenter
donation then we will always send the charity you nominated in Part One a donation of exactly £2.00 irrespective of if
and how much you donated from you participation fee. That is, your nominated charity will receive the sum of the exper-
imenter donation plus however much you decide to donate from your participation fee.
In practice, the decision process will work as follows. You will be paid your participation fee of £2.00 as ten 20 pence
pieces and then given two envelopes, one labelled ‘‘keep” and one labelled ‘‘charity”. The ‘‘charity” envelope contains the
provisional experimenter donation of £2.00.
If you wish to take money from the experimenter donation then you must place whatever proportion you wish to
take into the keep envelope along with your participation fee. Alternatively, however much of your participation fee you
wish to donate to your nominated charity you must place in the ‘‘charity” envelope and however much you want to keep you
must place in the ‘‘keep” envelope.
Before proceeding please answer the following questions:
Of her £2 participation fee Ashley donates £1 to her nominated charity:
1. How much will Ashley’s nominated charity receive in total? £__________
2. How much will Ashley keep? £__________
Of the £2 experimenter donation Ashley takes £1 from her nominated charity:
1. How much will Ashley’s nominated charity receive in total? £__________
2. How much will Ashley keep? £__________
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